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ABSTRACT 
Interlocal cooperation in the delivery of services 
is the subject of this thesis project. The study surveys 
the types of cooperation communities can engage in. It 
also examines how three communities cooperate in the pro-
vision of police and public works services. 
Interlocal cooperation can be defined as collabora-
tive efforts undertaken by two or more communities. In this 
study, cooperation is looked at in terms of the provision of 
services. Such cooperation can be formal or informal, 
single function or multi-function, and supplementary or 
complete. In any case, it is seen as a means for improving 
the delivery of services. 
Local services are financed through property taxes. 
People, these days, are demanding cuts in their property 
taxes. At the same time, they continue to demand services. 
The pressure is on administrators to find ways to provide 
services more efficiently and effectively. 
Administrative and organizational constraints hamper 
efforts to cooperate formally. The administrators of service 
systems of ten have the power to make verbal agreements 
among themselves. Such agreements are more amenable to the 
variety of administrative and organizational conditions 
which exist in a group of conununities. As a result, it was 
iii 
iv 
not shocking to find that cooperative efforts undertaken by 
the three communities examined are primarily informal. 
Informal cooperation has its place and communities should 
cooperate with one another in the delivery of services in 
whatever formal or informal manner their organizational and 
administrative situations necessitate. , 
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I. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF 
INTERLOCAL COOPERATION 
Interlocal cooperation in the delivery of services 
can be formal or informal, single function or multi-function 
partial or total, functionally oriented or geographically 
oriented, and dependent or independent. It can be called 
a council of government, a common council, a special dis-
trict, a metropolitan commission or a collaborative. Or, 
it may just exist through verbal agreements or written 
contracts. 
Formal systems are based on agreements, agreements 
made legal by legislation or contracts. Informal ones are 
based on verbal agreements. Some states have made formal 
agreements among communities possible through legislation. 
These agreements provide communities with a mechanism 
allowing them to jointly exercise powers in the delivery 
of services, formerly and solely the authority of local 
governments. They can be used to allow communities to 
jointly undertake functions and responsibilities which they 
already could (and did) individually. They can also be 
used to allow communities to collectively purchase supplies 
and facilities. 
The advantge of formal rather than informal is that 
formal agreements are legally secured, a written contract 
obligates all parties to participation. This becomes 
important when an organization is set up to coordinate and 
administer over a jointly needed service system. Each 
community has financial investments involved which they 
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may wish to protect. Sustained cooperation is necessary in 
order to protect investments. Formal agreements, such as 
legislation and contracts, prevent communities from "pulling 
out" unexpectedly. 
Generally, municipalities are restricted to formal 
contracts or informal agreements which are specifically 
stated in their charters, or implied in legislative acts 
and constitutional provisions. The powers of local govern-
ment usually end at their boundaries. All states, however, 
do authorize both formal and informal interlocal agreements 
for some purposes. For example, they can authorize the 
collective purchase of computers, the provision of mass 
transit, operation of parks and the collection and disposal 
of solid waste. 
In Pennsylvania, interlocal governments which 
formally collaborate in the operation of one or more 
functions (the delivery of one or more services) form 
''municipal authorities 11 • 1 They are allowable under a 1945 
act, the Municipal Authority Act. This legislation gives 
powers to all types of local governments, acting alone or 
in cooperation with one another. The local municipalities 
must adopt an ordinance . or resolution setting up the 
authority. The ordinance would be similar for all the 
communities involved. The Secretary of the Commonwealth 
reviews the ordinances for conformance with legal require-
ments. Finally, a certificate of incorporation is issued 
creating the authority. Communities can later withdraw 
from joint authorities if the authorities have not 
incurred any debts. If the authority consents, other 
communities can become a part of them. 
Local governments may or may not specify the 
authority's function. It can provide all the services or 
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functions of local governments (except local administration) 
so long as it does not duplicate them. These restrictions 
are intended to ensure that policy-making remains a local 
function and that competition between local municipal 
services and the authority's areawide services does not 
occur. The ·authority can provide revenue producing 
services such as bridges, flood control projects, parking 
facilities and shopping centers. After its formation, the 
sponsoring communities can increase or decrease the number 
of functions of the authority. 
The authorities have governing bodies which are 
selected by the local governments which create them. If 
two or more communities are involved, the authority's 
governing body must have at least one number from each 
sponsoring local government. Members of the governing body 
of the authority must be residents of the communities whose 
governments appointed them. 
Pennsylvania's municipal authorities are dependent 
special district governments. They lack sufficient fiscal 
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independence and administrative autonomy to be independent. 
Localities supply the authorities with most or all of their 
money. They have no "taking powers". 
This is the situation with all dependent special 
district governments. Although in some instances they may 
have considerable fiscal and administrative independence, 
their financial arrangements are almost always subject to 
review and revision by the parent localities. In addition, 
approval of the special district's plans or actions is 
required by either the executive or legislative body of the 
parent governments. Officers of the special district 
government, usually, are appointed by the chief executive 
or governing body of the parent governments, or are actually 
comprised of officials from the parent governments. 
The Census Bureau differentiates independent from 
dependent special districts by saying that independent 
special districts "exist as an organized entity" with 
"governmental characteristics" and "substantial autonomy". 2 
Independent special districts do have more control over 
their finances. They usually assess the communities within 
their jurisdiction for the services they provide, whereas 
dependent districts must accept what is appropriated to 
them. Agreements are formally secured by contracts. 
Independent special districts have their own bureaucracies 
and often have a board of directors or an executive council 
which determines policies. They are virtually autonomous 
units of government. They employ and dismiss personnel, 
purchase equipment, and determine the quantity and quality 
of service{s) they will deliver and the procedures or 
methods they will use to deliver them. They can exist for 
a single purpose (the provision of one service to communi-
ties) or for multiple purposes (the provision of several 
services). 
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In Massachusetts, for example, the Metropolitan 
District Commission (MDC) is an independent, multi-functional, 
partial, functionally oriented, cooperative service system. 
It is an independent special district service organization. 
It is not subject to scrutinization by local governments. 
It owns the resources from which it provides services (such 
as reservoirs for culinary water) , and provides those 
services on a contract basis to individual communities. It 
provides a variety of services, such as water, sewerage, 
and parks and recreation. Its services are intended to 
supplement those systems already operated by local govern-
ments. 
Some special district governments provide only 
supplementary services, such as the MDC. These organiza-
tions provide services over and above those already provided 
by local governments. The services they provide usually 
involve the meeting of multi-jurisdictional needs. For 
example, the MDC owns and operates a park system extending 
along the Charles River. This is a recreation service 
extending through many communities. 
Councils of government (COG's) are another type of 
collective system based on interlocal cooperation. Local 
officials voluntarily come together in councils of govern-
ments to discuss problems. They lack operating and 
enforcement powers and, therefore, are often used in 
contradiction to their purpose. Proposals for cooperative 
activity are talked about until everyone is tired of them 
and they forget them. This type of status quo organiza-
tion, although the discussions generated by it can be 
helpful, often hampers other attempts for both formal and 
informal cooperative agreements. 
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Local governments sometimes join together in common 
councils. These are merely councils of governments with a 
different name. They, like COG's, are formed to resolve 
conflicts about areawide issues. They are a mechanism for 
coping with alternatives, implications and choices. 
However, common councils run into the same pitfalls. Like 
councils of governments they tend to be unresponsive to the 
general public. Their participants are from the bureau-
cracies of the local governments involved, thus twice 
removed from the general public. In addition, they tend to 
focus on physical development. 
There is potential for using councils of governments 
and common councils for promoting interlocal cooperation 
and for being a policy-making body or an implementing 
organization for such agreements. participating represen-
tatives could be elected from the general public of the 
/ 
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co1tU11unities involved instead of, or as well as, from the 
bureaucracies of the member governments. With representa-
tion of the affected public, policy decisions relating to 
the public interests involved could be improved. In 
addition, a more diverse spectrum of issues might be raised, 
such as those relating to social problems. The councils 
must recognize that poverty, deprivation and discrimination 
in one section of a region have consequences to the entire 
region. The councils might then function as they were 
designed to, an organization to assist and advise individual 
local policy-makers regarding policies about areawide 
issues. They might then promote interjurisdictional agree-
ments for cooperation which reflect the interests and needs 
of the areawide co1tU11unity. 
County and township governments are two other 
mechanisms for fostering interlocal cooperation. County 
governments exist everywhere while townships exist in a 
dozen or so states. There are both active county govern-
ments, which deliver services, and county governments 
which exist only in name. The majority of active county 
governments are outside of New England and are most active 
where unincorporated areas exist, such as in the Midwest, 
the South and some areas of the West Coast. Townships 
exist primarily in the Northeast and the Midwest. However, 
in the Midwest counties are taking over most of the 
functions which townships used to be responsible for. The 
most active townships exist in Long Island and Upstate New York. 
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Both these governmental units already exist in many 
areas and could be activated for the purpose of fostering 
interlocal cooperation. There are shortcomings to this 
idea, however. Their jurisdictional boundaries are fixed 
and have been for some time. Patterns of development (and 
therefore the locations and patterns of activity) of the 
decades since they were instituted do not respect their 
boundaries. Therefore, the needs and problems of people 
arising from their location and activity do not contain 
themselves within individual counties and townships. And 
even if several counties were to get together, the problems 
might affect merely a portion of the communities in each 
and involvement of the remainder of the communities would 
be wasteful and would decrease any economies which might 
have accrued from collective action. Townships are smaller 
units but problems may involve communities of two or three 
of them leading to the same results. 
Another formal arrangement of interlocal cooperation 
involves metropolitan governments. These can be called 
conference, councils, commissions, and associations. 
However, they are merely cooperative governments formed by 
bringing together one or more large cities and some or all 
of the suburban communities (and/or counties) about them 
in an attempt to more efficiently and effectively meet 
their collective needs and problems. They can take the 
form of councils of governments, common councils, special 
districts, or even collaboratives. Metropolitan governments 
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serve the same purposes as other interlocal cooperative 
organizations--meeting areawide needs, solving multi-
jurisdictional problems. The only difference is that the 
focus is on metropolitan regions instead of on a collection 
of small and similar communities. The relationship of a 
city to its neighboring communities tends to be different 
than the relationships among small communities. Inter-
dependence is different. In a metropolitan area, 
interdependence is between the city and each individual 
community; whereas, in an area of small communities, 
interpendence is each between each other. Therefore, 
systems of metropolitan cooperation must be distinguished 
from non-metropolitan ones. 
Many communities participate in mechanisms formaliz-
ing cooperation. However, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations has reported that it is not 
uncommon to find administrators of service systems in 
communities making informal agreements with one another. 3 
Many communities realize that there will be times when 
their service systems alone will not be able to cope with 
a problem or meet a need. As a result, they allow their 
administrators discretion in making agreements. The 
administrators know the limitations of their service 
systems. They know what type of cooperative ventures they 
can manage. They also know what types they will need in 
the future. It is therefore delegated to them to decide 
what, how and when to jointly undertake functions or to 
provide or accept services from one another. 
Many communities see informal cooperation as an 
alternative to the establishment of and participation in 
formal organizations. It does require more effort on the 
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part of administrators to initiate cooperation because there 
is no forum which would facilitate it, and, there is no 
formal structure to cooperation which takes place informally. 
Informal agreements are based on mutual trust and respect 
among administrators. With no legal contract there is 
potential for abuse. The Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations has found, however, that communities 
are willing to take the risks to avoid the "red tape'' 
involved with formal systems. 4 Informal cooperation allows 
agreements to be flexible enough to meet the diversity of 
problems which confront administrators, and to meet them 
quickly. 
Local communities are both production and consump-
tion units. However, because of problems inherent in both 
activities, communities must cooperate with each other. 
Whether cooperation is formal or informal, three issues 
become critical to its success. They are politics, 
economics and administration. The three are reviewed in 
the following section. 
II. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
ISSUES ·INVOLVED IN INTERLOCAL COOPERATION 
Local governments could be considered basic 
building blocks in solving areawide problems. Communities 
are not isolated from one another. There are issues dealing 
with the delivery of services which do cut across local 
boundaries. These issues must be dealt with, and dealt 
with on a cooperative basis. Cooperative actions, there-
fore, can improve the capability of local governments to 
serve people. 
Political issues surface when cooperative service 
delivery systems are mentioned. One of the major ones is 
that of centralization versus decentralization. This 
issue itself is a complex amalgam of other issues such 
as equity, economic efficiency, citizen access and control, 
and local autonomy. In promoting cooperative service 
delivery systems we are promoting some degree of 
centralization. 
The equity of regional service delivery systems is 
one of the things which is often questioned. Can such a 
system provide services impartially or fairly to all? Will 
some be favored and others forgotten? As the number of 
people being served increases, and as service delivery 
systems grow to meet their collective needs, can justice 
to done to individual needs or the needs of small groups 
within the region. 
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The question could be directed toward individual 
communities. Are separate local service systems 
equitable? One of the functions of the level of services 
a community provides is its wealth, or the wealth of its 
residents. Therefore, it follows that there is a tendency 
for wealthier communities to spend more on services than 
those who are not as financially secure. 
Areawide delivery of services could increase equity 
within a region. It could do so by doubling as a mechanism 
for the redistribution of wealth. Communities who partici-
pate in cooperative arrangements usually do so for 
benefits. Wealthier communities could subsidize the extra 
services for poorer ones if three conditions existed. 
The wealthier communities desire a higher level of services 
than the poorer ones. Only one level of services are 
to be provided throughout the region. The poorer communities 
couldn't pay for more than a level which is significantly 
lower than that desired by the wealthy. They would 
probably do this, too, if the amount they were saving 
by being part of the cooperative system were greater than 
the subsidy they had to pay. 
The economic efficiency of cooperative systems is 
another issue. Will such a system increase economic 
efficiency; or, will it, in fact, decrease efficiency because 
it increases the complexity of administrative interrelation-
ships? The theory of economies of scale suggests that it 
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will increase economic efficiency; however, other 
theories suggest that the new bureaucracy which is created, 
will, in fact, decrease efficiency, reducing or eliminating 
benefits from economies of scale. One such theory is from 
the field of political science. It deals with administrative 
spans of control. As an organization or administrative 
unit becomes larger, hiatuses develop in the chain of 
command. These gaps between superiors and subordinates 
grow as an agency gets larger. As they do, administrative 
effectiveness decreases, followed by similar losses in 
efficiency. Filling in the gaps requires more people 
which cost more money, thereby reducing further the benefits 
derived from economies of scale. 
Another issue at hand is that of citizen access and 
control. This issue deals with the proximity of the 
governmental unit (in this case the administration of one 
or more service systems) to the people. Basic to this 
issue is a dilemma of democracy: active participation 
versus the need to obtain a consensus. While enlightened 
and responsive governmental action can result from 
dialogues between people and officials, so too can 
chaos and often inaction. However, a close proximity of 
the people to governmental units which provide them with 
services can prevent and expose corruption, foster 
innovation (by facilitating the use of residents to 
assist staff), and allow for easy and timely feedback 
(and interaction in general). 
The next issue is local autonomy. 
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It is a sensitive 
issue in some parts of the country, especially New 
England. Local governments are a unit of the political 
system of this country through which people have come 
to trust that they can have an effective say in policy-
making. Local governments provide a variety of services, 
and can provide various levels of services. Different 
communities have different value sets, different needs, 
different incomes. Decisions must be made within each 
community as to the appropriate or desirable level of 
services. These are policy decisions and are made by the 
people for whom the services are provided, the residents of 
each community. Since communities differ, the levels and 
combinations of services in each will differ somewhat. 
Thus, local governments are a workable unit through 
which people can participate to tailor services to their 
needs. 
In larger cities neighborhood organizations are 
becoming mediums through which people exercise their 
policy-making rights. These organizations have become 
surrogates of the small community's political environment. 
As cities have grown in population, so has the need for 
their service delivery systems to grow. As the service 
systems have grown, so have the governments in general, in 
order to accommodate, coordinate and administer services. 
More people means that each individual, and their particular 
needs, is less important in decisions regarding combinations 
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and levels of services. Large numbers of people become 
so heterogeneous that the community's needs in terms of 
services become amorphous. This, and the increasing .size 
of the bureaucracy in general, give a life to the bureau-
cracy all its own. Policy decisions are virtually 
irrelevant with respect to small communities of people. 
Neighborhood organizations, as smaller, somewhat more 
homogeneous groups of people are seen as a way to make policy 
decisions relevant and to give municipal service systems 
a definable unit to which to tailor service delivery. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations has given a word of caution to localities consider-
ing consolidation or centralization of functions. It sums 
up the major concerns of this issue. 
Every Unit of government should be responsible 
for a sufficient number of functions so that its 
governing processes involve a resolution of conflict-
ing interest, with sufficient responsibility for 
balancing governmental needs and resources. Thus, 
in the dµrisdictional allocation of individual 
functions, there is an ever present danger of creat-
ing so many separate entities as to result in 
undemocratic, inequitable, and inadequate assignment 
of priorities.5 
The potential economies from centralization should 
be viewed carefully. Centralization itself has costs, 
and they tend to increase as centralization becomes 
extensive. Any function can be centralized. However, 
there is a point where economies gained through centrali-
zation begin to diminish and eventually become diseconomies. 
Even so, centralization does allow a grouping of activities, 
bulk purchases of supplies, the sharing of capital 
equipment and facilities and other practices which 
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can lower overall costs. Formal cooperative service delivery 
systems do involve centralization. However, the centraliz-
ing involved can vary widely in form and degree. 
The desirability of cooperation varies from service 
to service. Werner z. Hirsch has studied the local versus 
areawide service delivery problem·. 6 He has developed 
some criteria to help in the decision as to whether or 
not communities would benefit from consolidating their 
service delivery systems into an areawide system. He 
looked at these criteria for each function or service that 
a community provides. The criteria are: the minimization 
of spillovers, the maximization of scale economies, the 
sufficiency of '. geographical area, legal and administrative 
ability, functional sufficiency, controllability and 
accessibility by constituents, and maximization of citizen 
participation consistent with adequate performance. These 
criteria give the necessary information for three critical 
considerations in organizing service delivery system--
economics, administration and policy or politics. 
The primary reason for considering reorganizing 
municipal service delivery systems is economics. In 
delivering local services, it is most desirable to minimize 
spillovers. A spillover is when residents of one community 
are impacted by any portion of the costs and/or benefits 
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resulting from services provided by a municipal government 
other than their own. Spillovers are bound to occur 
to some degree with any system; but, if "spill-ins" don't 
offset "spill-outs", welfare inequities result. It is 
therefore desirable to adjust service delivery systems in 
order to minimize spillovers. 
For example, some roads which pass through a community 
are used by motorists other than residents of that community. 
Others are benefiting from road maintenance and repair 
services provided by the community and paid for by 
residents. There are spillovers. Many communities have 
similar roads, .roads used by non-resident motorists. The 
number and length of these road vary. Welfare inequities 
exist. In order to compensate for the inequities the service 
delivery systems of each community are adjusted. Those 
roadways which are used by non-residents are designated 
county, state, interstate or US routes. They are then 
-
partially serviced by, or servicing by local highway depart-
ments is partially paid for by, that level of government 
which best represents the regional jurisdiction from which 
the non-resident motorists originate. 
Maximization of scale economies and suff iency of 
the geographical area for supporting a service delivery 
system are the two other economic considerations. Both 
vary with the service being delivered. They involve the 
minimum and maximum capacities of the system(s) involved. 
There is a minimum and maximum geographic area within 
which any system can effectively and efficiently service. 
Geographic area sufficiency is closely tied to the 
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scale of the service system. The scale at which the system 
is most efficient is determined by the laws of economies of 
scale and diminishing returns to scale. Therefore, the 
geographic area and the scale of the system are critical 
economic factors which should be considered in relation to 
one another. 
There are two administrative criteria in the Hirsch 
model. They are: legal and administrative ability, and 
functional sufficiency. If an areawide service system is 
set up, it is better if its organization includes 
administration and its administrative body has legally dele-
gated powers. Adminstration by local governments or a 
board of representatives from them is not good. A full 
time administrator and staff with the power to make 
adminstrative decisions is necessary for the system to 
operate as efficiently and as effectively as possible. 
If administration is done by a board or remotely from local 
governments, decisions will be slow, costing time and 
money. A board is useful for policy decisions but 
not for administrative decisions. If provisions are made 
for an administrator and staff but no legal powers are 
given to them, their decisions may not be carried out, their 
commands have no standing. 
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Policy or politics must also be considered; and, 
provisions for them must be incorporated in decisions about 
orga,niza.ti.on an areawide service delivery system. Two 
criteria which Hirsch has established for this purpose 
are: controllability and accessibility of contituents, 
and maximization of citizen participation. The affected 
public, those people for whom the system operates, should 
be involved in policy decisions, decisions such as what 
functions will be incorporated in the areawide system, what 
level of services will be offered, and what the priorities 
involved are. In a local community, the resident$ ~ake 
these decisions through voting, and through their elected 
representatives. Their interests are represented when 
decisions are made regarding levels and/or combinations of 
services, or whether or not to continue operating the system. 
Citizens cannot be included in every decision (such as 
adminstrative decisions); however, meaningful citizen 
participation can be consistent with adequate performance 
of the system. In addition to involvement in policy-making, 
clients should be provided with means of communicating with 
the system. They should have an easy way to commend or 
criticize the services they receive. Feedback is 
essential for efficient and effective delivery of services 
and a,dequ~temechanisms for communicating with the affected 
public are necessary in order to receive feedback. 
Hirsch tested his criteria on eighteen traditional 
urban service functions. The following tables show the 
results. Table 1. summarizes the results of testing two 
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criteria used to determine whether or not the services 
themselves favor local or areawide operation. The criteria 
considered were (1) the expectation of important scale 
economies and (2) the necessity of political proximity. 
It was found that important scale economies could be 
expected from eight of the eighteen services considered. 
The second criteria was the proximity of people to the 
bureaucracy of the individual service system and to the 
general governmental bodies which make policies for the 
individual systems. It was found that close proximity 
of the people to the government was particularly important 
with six services. There were eight services where 
political proximity was found to be of little consequence. 
With the remaining four services it was found that closeness 
of the people to the government was important sometimes and 
not other times. 
Table 2 shows the results from testing two criteria 
used to determine who should finance what services (at what 
level of government should assessments be made and resources 
allocated). The criteria which were used were the 
expectation of benefit spill-overs from the services and 
the role of - income redistribution in delivering services. 
Of the eighteen services considered, in only ten could 
major spillover benefits be expected; and, with only six 
TABLE 1 
URBAN GOVERNMENT SERVICES FAVORING 
LOCAL vs. AREAWIDE OPERATION 
Services 
Air pollution control 
Education 
Fire protection 
Hospitals 
Libraries 
Neighborhood parks 
& recreation 
Planning 
Police 
Power 
Public health services 
Public housing 
Public welfare services 
Refuse collection 
Sewage disposal 
Street maintenance 
Transportation 
Urban renewal 
Important 
scale economies 
can be expected 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
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Political prox-
imity is consi-
dered essential 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes and no 
yes and no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes and no 
yes and no 
SOURCE: National Tax Journal, "Urban Government Services", 
Werner z. Hirsch, p. 333. 
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TABLE 2 
URBAN GOVERNMENT SERVICES FAVORING LOCAL 
vs. AREAWIDE vs. NATIONWIDE FINANCING 
Air pollution control 
Education 
Fire protection 
Hospitals 
Libraries 
Neighborhood parks 
& recreation 
Planning 
Police 
Power 
Public health services 
Public housing 
Public welfare services 
Refuse collection 
Sewage disposal 
Street maintenance 
Transportation 
Urban renewal 
Major 
benefit spillovers 
can be expected 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Income 
redistribution 
plays an impor-
tant role 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
SOURCE: National Tax Journal, "Urban Government Services'.', 
Werner Z. Hirsch, p. 336. 
of the eighteen did income redistribution play an 
important role. 
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The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations has also studied interlocal cooperation. A part 
of their study, somewhat applicable, is the reasons 
communities gave for participating or not participating in 
regional councils (formal cooperative organizations). 
They asked a set of questions of local governments regard-
ing why they participated in the formation of regional 
councils (see Table 3). The most important reason given 
by the communities sampled was to initiate cooperative 
approaches to solving regional problems. A second survey 
was done questioning why communities joined regional 
councils (see Table 4). A similar reason was most 
frequently given as most important. The second most 
important reason given for participating in regional 
councils (in both surveys) was that it was necessary to 
obtain Federal funds. A pattern of responses to these 
surveys and the two most important reasons for participat-
ing in regional councils was recognized by the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Larger 
communities over 100,000 population participated primarily 
for the second reason, to obtain Federal funds, while smaller 
ones did so mainly for the first reason, to reach solutions 
to local problems. 
TABLE 3 
REASONS GIVEN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR FORMING REGIONAL COUNCILS: 1972 
Reason 
Total 
Initiate cooperative approaches to 
solving general regional problems 
Meet serious problem in a specific 
funcitonal area 
Formalize previous informal cooperative 
arrangements 
Offset some State action or threat 
of action 
Compliance with planning requirements 
of Federal grant-in-aid programs 
Compliance with areawide review require-
ments under Section 204 and 
Circular A-95 
Number of 
Cities 
Reporting 
987 
829 
228 
282 
94 
723 
295 
Weighted 
Mean* 
1. 5 
2.4 
2.6 
2.3 
1. 8 
2.4 
Number of 
Counties 
Reporting 
629 
531 
153 
160 
64 
498 
199 
Weighted 
Mean* 
1. 5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.3 
1. 9 
2.4 
SOURCE: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Regional Decision Making: 
* 
New Strategies for Substate Districts. Table IV-2, page 117. 
Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons that their 
regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 being the next 
most important reasons.) 
N 
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TABLE 4 
REASONS GIVEN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR JOINING REGIONAL COUNCILS: 1972 
Reason 
Number of 
Cities 
Reporting 
Weighted 
Mean* 
Number of 
Counties 
Reporting 
Weighted 
Mean* 
Total 
Forum for discussion of regional 
problems 
Contribute significantly to solution 
of areawide problems 
Contribute significantly to solution 
of local problems 
Improve cooperation between central 
city and suburbs 
Necessary to obtain Federal funds 
Necessary to obtain State funds 
Concurrence with idea although doubtful 
of any real local benefits 
810 
413 
564 
322 
169 
463 
146 
104 
573 
2.0 277 1. 9 
1. 8 407 1. 8 
2.1 272 2.0 
2.3 83 2.6 
1. 8 393 1. 8 
2.2 124 2.3 
2.4 73 2.4 
SOURCE: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Regional Decision Making: 
* 
New Strategies for Substate Districts. Table IV-3, page 118. 
Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their 
regional council was formed (one being the most important reason; 2 and 3 the next most 
important reasons). 
N 
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Another survey was undertaken to determine 
why communities did not participate in regional councils 
(see Table 5). The most important reason given was that 
they are too often dominated by the largest communities. 
This reason was closely followed by three others: the 
planning and delivery of services were thought to be 
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better performed at the local level; such organizations 
caused unnecessary administrative delays to Federal funding 
of local programs; and, the councils were seen as too 
costly to local taxpayers. 
Several inferences might be gained from the 
responses to these three surveys. First, communities 
seem to be interested in working with one another. 
While Federal programs have induced larger communities 
into undertaking cooperative ventures when they might not 
have otherwise done so, smaller communities indicated that 
they were primarily motivated by a desire to solve their 
individual problems, as well as the problems of their 
neighbors. Second, the majority of communities see 
regional council as an arena or forum in which cooperation 
can be initiated. 
Would these same communities who indicated that their 
primary reason for participating in a formal organization 
was to meet local needs on an areawide basis join together 
with one another if there were no formal mechanisms 
facilitating it? One of the surveys did indicate that 
TABLE 5 
REASONS FOR LOCAL NON-MEMBERSHIP IN REGIONAL COUNCILS: 
Reason 
Total 
Weakened influence in State and 
Federal policy decisions 
Unnecessary red tape delaying Federal 
funding of local programs 
Regional council would receive Federal 
and State funds otherwise allocated 
to local government 
Planning and delivery of services could 
be performed better at local level 
than at regional level 
Too costly to taxpayers 
Domination by largest county or 
central city 
Domination by many smaller governments 
Other 
Number of 
Cities 
Reporting 
155 
11 
32 
4 
33 
30 
36 
4 
56 
Percent 
of 
Total 
100 
7 
21 
3 
21 
19 
23 
3 
36 
1972 
Number of 
Counties 
Reporting 
49 
6 
16 
4 
23 
15 
20 
22 
Percent 
of 
total 
100 
12 
33 
8 
47 
31 
41 
45 
SOURCE: The Advisor¥ Commission in Intergovernmental Relations Regional Decision Making: 
New Strategies for Substate Districts. Table IV-1, page 116. 
IV 
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about twenty percent of the respondents were participating 
in formal cooperative arrangements before joining a regional 
council. It is unclear from the summary of the survey 
whether the twenty percent joined a regional council because 
they outgrew their informal arrangements or because they 
had other problems with the agreements which could only be 
corrected by formalizing them. 
The following section is an examination of cooperation 
among three communities. They are all participating in 
informal ~greements which they make as a need arises; and, 
they have indicated that they have had no problems 
resulting from the fact that they are not cooperating 
formally. 
III. INTERLOCAL COOPERATION AND THE DELIVERY 
OF POLICE AND PUBLIC WORKS SERVICES 
IN THREE COMMUNITIES 
The organization of service delivery systems in 
three communities are examined here to aid in the applica-
tion of concepts of cooperation among them. The 
communities are Framingham, Natick and Wellesley. They are 
contiguous communities in the South Middlesex area of 
Massachusetts. Land use in each is mixed. A major portion 
of it is single family sprawl-type development. However, 
Framingham in the recent past, and Natick most recently, 
have incurred sharp increases in the construction of 
multi-family dwellings. In addition to residential uses, 
a dense core of commercial and business establishments 
extends through Natick and Framingham (and less densely 
through Wellesley) along several state highways. Indus-
tries are located in all three communities, also along 
major highways. The entire South Middlesex area is 
rapidly growing, and, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley and 
the communities about them have been identified as an 
SMSA by the Bureau of the Census for the 1980 census. 
All three communities have a town meeting form of 
government with a board of selectmen who oversee govern-
ment functions. In addition, Framingham has an executive 
administrator (town manager) in charge of day to day 
activities (since the board of selectmen meet only weekly). 
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All departments (and therefore all services the town pro-
vides) are overseen by elected or appointed boards, 
conunissions and committees. For example, the school 
committee oversees the operation of the school department, 
the board of public works oversees the activities of the 
department of public works (see Figures 2, 3 and 4). 
Framingham is the largest of the three communities 
both in population and in area. Approximately 68,000 
people live in this 25-1/2 square mile community. There 
are 19 boards or commissions overseeing governmental 
activities amounting to the involvement of over 100 
residents in the delivery of services. In addition, 211 
residents participate in policy-making as town meeting 
t . 7 representa ives. 
Natick is the second largest with more than 31,000 
people living on 16 square miles of land. There are 46 
boards or commissions involving more than 225 residents 
in governmental activities. In addition, there are 240 
residents who are town meeting representatives partaking 
. l' k' 8 in po icy-ma ing. 
9 Approximately 27,000 people live in Wellesley. 
Wellesley covers about 10-1/4 square miles. 10 More than 
137 people are involved in some 28 to 30 boards or com-
missions overseeing departmental operations. 11 There are 
also 240 people representing the residents in policy-making 
. 12 
at town meetings. 
FIGURE 2 
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FRAMINGHAM TOWN GOVERNMENT 
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SOURCE: Town of Framingham. 277th Annual Report:l977. 
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FIGURE 3 
'ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATICK TOWN GOVERNMENT 
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SOURCE: League of Women Voters. Know Natick. page 14. 
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FIGURE 4 
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WELLESLEY TOWN GOVERNMENT 
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SOURCE: Town of Wellesley. 1978 Annual Report. 
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A closer examination of the organizations of 
service systems is necessary for evaluation and recommenda-
tion of potentials for interlocal cooperation. Two 
departments in each of the three communities were reviewed, 
the department of public works and the police department. 
The services provided by each department vary from 
community to community. In addition, their administrative 
organizations vary. No formal cooperation exists between 
the three communities with either of the two services. 
However, each of the two departments in each community does 
engage in informal agreements. The reason given by both 
departments in each community for having informal but not 
formal agreements is that there is no need for formal 
t t th t . . f 1 ff . 13 agreemen s a e presen time, in orma ones su ice. 
Public works departments were examined for the 
services they offer and their organization. The public 
works department of Framingham is broken up into four 
divisions--highways, water, sewer and sanitation (see 
Figure 5). Each has working foremen and workers. Their 
activities are coordinated by a central administrator and 
an assistant administrator. There is an administrative 
staff as well as two auxiliary functions: utilities and 
streets construction inspector and auto service. Even 
though Framingham has organized four services within one 
department there is still a general administrator for each 
division (superintendents). The services may be benefiting 
by sharing clerical personnel and by increased coordination, 
FIGURE 5 
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FRAMINGHAM PUBLI C WORKS DEPARTMENT 
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w 
SOURCE: Interview with Ralph Chipman, 'Department of Public Works, Framingham, Massachusetts, March 1979. °' 
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but the director, assistant director and office manager are 
three additional (highly paid) positions resulting from the 
grouping of the services. 
Within the town's bureaucracy, the public works 
department relies on the work of the engineering department 
which is a separately functioning department. It also 
relies on the auxilliary services of the general government 
such as the treasurer, purchasing and personnel. Informal 
interaction between department heads occurs all the time. 
The public works department operates the municipal garage 
for maintenance and repair of all equipment and vehicles 
except the fire department's. 
With the highway and water divisions, informal agree-
ments exist. They are practical working agreements with 
the supervisors of the same departments of neighboring 
communities. For example, the water division has some 
agreements with Natick. Their pipes are connected with 
gates closing them off from each other most of the time. 
However, if water pressure gets too low on the border of 
one town, they call up the other and request that they open 
up the gates until the pressure builds back up. 
Agreements also exist with other towns regarding 
sewer and sanitation services. Ashland (and maybe Southboro 
in the near future), a small neighboring community pumps 
their sewage through Framingham's pipes to get to the MDC 
mains (which carry the sewage to a treatment facility on 
Deer Island) . The public works department sends them a 
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bill (according to a contract) for the services. The 
sanitation division of the department operates an inciner-
ator. The town of Ashland makes use of it. Billing is 
similar to that for sewer service. The town has formal 
agreements, contracts, with the MDC. With them it 
purchases most of the water residents use from the MDC. It 
supplements MDC water with its own wells. 
As far as citizen access is concerned, when people 
have questions or problems about one of the public works 
services in Framingham, they call that division. Feedback 
is direct and easily facilitated. In Natick, feedback is 
channeled through the main off ice of the public works 
department. The office relays messages to the individual 
departments. 
Natick's public works department also has four 
divisions (departments within the overall department), 
however it differs from Framingham's slightly (see Figure 
6). There are highway and sanitation departments just as 
there are in Framingham. The water and sewer divisions are 
combined into one department and the maintenance garage is 
a separate department. There are no superintendents admin-
istering over the individual departments; there are 
expert/supervisors in charge of them. There are also working 
foremen and workers in each. A director and an assistant 
director oversee all activities. The assistant director 
has a dual function. He is also the chief engineer (expert/ 
supervisor of the engineering department) . The engineering 
FIGURE 6 
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATICK PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 
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SOURCE: Interview with Edwin Fannon, Department of Public Works, Natick, Massachusetts, March 1979. 
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department is within the department of public works 
umbrella. There is also an office administrator who super-
vises a staff of clerks. The office work is for the 
overall department, individual departments within it and 
the public works board. 
Natick has both formal and informal agreements for 
service cooperation with neighboring communities. The 
informal water agreement with Framingham has been mentioned. 
A similar, but formal (written contract) agreement exists 
with Wellesley. There are also sewer agreements. These 
agreements exist primarily because of natural barriers 
(streams, ledges, etc.) which make service provision by 
Natick's DPW too costly. Service is thereby provided by 
neighboring communities who bill the individuals receiving 
the service directly. In addition, Dover does not have a 
sewer system so individual hookups are allowed through 
individual agreements and through a trust. Agreements also 
exist with the state and with Dover to allow Natick (DPW) 
to search for water on property within their jurisdictions. 
Within Dover, Natick operates and maintains the pumps in 
exchange for some of the water. Natick pumps the rest into 
Dover. There is also informal mutual aid in the form of 
exchanges of supplies. For example, if Natick needs a part 
and Framingham has one, Natick buys it from them. 
Wellesley's public works department differs from 
Framingham's and Natick's in that there are more divisions 
(see Figure 7). It has a highway and a sanitation division. 
FIGURE 7 
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WELLESLEY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 
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It also has a combined water-sewer division and the 
engineering function is a division of the department of 
public works, as they are in Natick. However, in addition 
to these divisions it also has a park division and an 
electrical division. The park division is responsible for 
the construction and maintenance of the town's parks. The 
electrical division generates and distributes electricity. 
It also installs, maintains and repairs traffic signals, 
fire alarms and police communications. 
The department has a general director and an assist-
ant director who is also the town engineer (like Natick). 
Like the public works departments in Natick and Framingham, 
Wellesley's has an administrative staff segment, office 
functions, which they call the financial branch. Each 
division within the department of public works has a super-
intendent with the exception of the park division which 
has a general foreman. Wellesley's department of public 
works seems to be similar to Framingham's in that there are 
many supervisors. The highway division, for example, has 
a superintendent, an assistant superintendent, two general 
foremen and four working foremen to coordinate the work of 
only thirty-nine workers. 
The public works departments of the three towns vary 
in the services they deliver and in their organizational 
management. Table 6 is a comparison of the services each 
delivers. A formalized cooperative system of public works 
services with a centralized bureaucracy would require 
TABLE 6 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERING CERTAIN SERVICES 
Service 
electric generation and distribution 
engineering 
fire alarms/police communications/ 
traffic signals: installation 
and repair 
highways: construction 
maintenance 
snowplowing 
cleaning 
municipal garage 
park development and upkeep 
sewerage 
solid waste: collection 
landfill 
incineration 
recycling 
tree planting, maintenance and removal 
waterworks 
Framingham 
EDIS 
ENG 
FD 
PRIV 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
REC 
DPW/MDC 
DPW 
DPW 
FOR 
MDC/DPW 
Town Department of Public Works 
Boston Edison Company 
Town Engineering Department 
Town Fire Department 
Town Forestry/Tree Department 
Metropolitan District Commission 
Private Contractors 
Natick 
EDIS 
DPW 
FD 
PRIV 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
REC 
DPW/MDC 
DPW 
DPW 
FOR 
DPW 
DPW 
EDIS 
ENG 
FD 
FOR 
MDC 
PRIV 
REC Town Recreation and Parks Department 
SOURCE: Compiled from town budgets and interviews, March, 1979. 
Wellesley 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
PRIV 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW/MDC 
DPW 
PRIV 
DPW 
DPW 
DPW/MDC 
~ 
w 
extensive organizational development not only within the 
public works departments of the three towns but also 
within the entire governments. Individual services could 
be separated out, such as water, sewer, highways and 
sanitation, and centralized; however, problems with 
operational procedures and equipment do exist, especially 
with water, sewer and sanitation. 
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With water, Natick and Wellesley rely on wells while 
Framingham relies on MDC surface water. The equipment is 
different (values in the pipes operate differently) . The 
region would have to be divided up into districts with 
certain specially trained personnel assigned to each 
district. Supervisors would then be required for coordin-
ating activities of the personnel of each. Thus losing 
any advantages from centralization. The situation is 
similar with sewerage. 
With sanitation, Framingham operates an incinerator 
while Natick a landfill; and Wellesley contracts a private 
incinerator and recycles recyclables. All three could use 
Frarningham's incinerator; however, because of transportation 
costs it would probably be cheaper to divide the region 
into districts again using all three disposal methods. The 
end result would be a system operating in a similar fashion 
to the present one only administered by a larger, more 
centralized bureaucracy. Benefits would accrue to the 
towns from a formal centralized structure; however, it is 
more than likely that the costs will outweigh the benefits. 
Each of the three communities has their own police 
departments. The departments are similar in that they 
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each provide several basic services--public education about 
crime, police patrol, crime follow-up, overnight lock-up, 
traffic and parking control, and firearms control. The 
organizations examined here are those of Framingham and 
Natick. The organization chart of Wellesley's police 
department was unavailable. 
Framingham's police department, like Natick's and 
Wellesley's is administered by a chief. The chief is not 
only an expert in the operations of the services delivered 
by the department but also the administrator. In 
Framingham the chief has a staff for training, community 
services, and planning and research finance. Other admin-
istrative functions are organized in a separate bureau (one 
of three) under the executive officer, the bureau of 
services. This division includes administrative functions 
(personnel, records, etc.) safety (traffic control, 
parking, etc.) and inspections (personnel operations and 
equipment) . 
The two other divisions (bureaus) under the execu-
tive officer are operations and investigation. Operations 
is divided into shifts (three eight hour shifts) . The 
functions of this division are communications and control. 
The investigation division is divided by function. It 
includes a detective and rape unit, a juvenile unit, photo 
46 
and identification unit, and a legal unit. Figure 8 shows 
the organization of the Framingham Police Department. 
Natick's police department has a somewhat similar 
hierarchy (see Figure 9). There is a chief and an 
executive off icer (who functions as prosecutor). There is 
an operations division and an investigative division. 
However, the staff and bureau of services divisions of the 
Framingham police department are combined under a single 
unit of administrative staff in Natick. 
Informal agreements for mutual assistance do exist 
between Framingham, Natick, Wellesley and all neighboring 
communities. By law, policemen have jurisdiction within 
their communities, and one thousand rods over their borders 
into neighboring communities. All police departments 
usually respect the borders except when informal agreements 
for patrol within the one thousand rod zone and when aid 
requested. If aid is requested, temporary police powers 
within the community requesting the assistance are granted 
to officers requested to enter. If there is some emergency 
and officers of one community have not yet been requested 
by the other, the entering officers still could make 
arrests under citizen arrest laws. 
An example of mutual assistance occurred one night 
when police were called to break up a brawl at a restaur-
ant/bar. The establishment is in Framingham but only 
several hundred feet from the Natick border. The 
Framingham police were called. The Framingham dispatcher 
sent policement to the scene. The site, however, .is in a 
FIGURE 8 
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remote corner of the town and it takes more time than 
usual for policemen to respond. The Framingham dispatcher 
notified the Natick dispatcher that assistance was desired. 
The Natick dispatcher was already monitoring Framingham's 
communications (a regional communications system exists to 
improve mutual assistance response time) and sending 
patrolmen toward the scene. Natick police arrived first, 
broke up the brawl and made arrests. Upon arrival, 
Framingham police backed up the Natick police. 
Interlocal cooperation with regards to police 
services also exist between Natick and Framingham in the 
form of training (mutual practices and drills). In 
addition, ideas and information (dealing with administration 
and operations) are shared among all communities through 
both informal and formal mechanisms. For example, the 
Natick police department recently contracted cohorts in 
the towns of Sanwich and Wayland regarding grant writing 
and application procedures (these towns recently received 
money to purchase motorcycle and a videotape machine) . 
Formal mechanisms such as the state organizations of safety 
officers and drug enforcement officers, and police chief 
associations facilitate the exchange of information and 
ideas. Some police departments also exchange personnel 
(temporarily) for undercover investigations. Local police 
also assist and receive assistance from state police. 
Local policebackup state police on calls and the state 
police in turn assist local police with investigations and 
chemical analyses. 
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An institutional structure could be a desirable forum 
for facilitating and generating discussion. The police 
departments have organizations forbrin~ingtogether 
individuals involved in similar functions among them for 
the exchange of ideas. For example, there is a state 
organization of safety officers, an organization of drug 
enforcement officers and a police chiefs association. 
Their organizations provide a common meeting place for dis-
cussing mutual problems and for the exchange of possible 
solutions. 
A formal collaborativ e effort was attempted on the 
14 
county level. ''It started out big but fissled out." 
Suffolk County is attempting to initiate a formal informa-
tion exchange. Instead of bringing individuals together 
it will require monthly reports and redistribute them to 
each department within the county. This will provide a 
regular exchange of information and the organizations will 
facilitate face to face interaction. The officers inter-
viewed felt that no other formal mechanisms or institutional 
structures were necessary. 
A formal centralized police department, a regional 
organization to facilitate interlocal interaction and to 
gain benefits from economies of scale seems to be both 
unnecessary (as far as facilitating interaction) and 
legislatively difficult (because of the geographical 
limitations on powers of officers). The centralized 
bureaucracy could coordinate activities of divisions based 
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on local boundaries. It seems, however, that coordination 
that is presently necessary already exists informally, and 
a formal superstructure would merely add personnel and 
facilities whose cost probably could not be recouped 
through economies of scale. 
The public works departments of the communities 
studied do have organizations similar to the police depart-
ments. They have no forum in which discussion can be 
facilitated. Initiatives require more effort on the part 
of the individual communities. As a result interaction 
and cooperation has been dyadic in nature. This may not be 
that bad, though, because their needs seem to justify such 
interaction. 
Since police officers are legislatively confined to 
their communities their efforts in collaborating focus on 
operational procedures and information. Public works 
services are not so restricted. They can extend their 
services across local boundaries. They use semi-permanent 
capital equipment in some of their services, such as water 
and sewer pipes and pumps. Therefore, they cannot reorgan-
ize operations such as police departments can. In order 
to efficiently and effectively accommodate development and 
provide services they turn toward their neighbors for 
assistance in providing the services. 
Formal organizations for the discussion of problems 
and the exchange of information about the delivery of water 
and sewer services might not be worth the time involved. 
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With other public works services (such as highway main-
tenance, refuse collection and disposal, and park 
construction and maintenance) such an organization might 
be helpful. Since assessment for such services is more 
difficult to calculate than for water or sewer services, 
and since communities usually purchase only enough equip-
ment and facilities to service themselves it is more 
difficult to extend such services beyond local boundaries. 
Therefore, procedures of delivery become more important. 
Organizations such as those police departments participate 
in would provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and 
the initiation of discussion. 
It is not recommended that a centralized cooperative 
organization of police services or public works services 
be formed. Such an organization would require extensive 
reorganization of the departments involved as well as the 
governments of the communities in general. A centralized 
bureaucracy in each of the service systems could coordinate 
the activities of the divisions of each among the com-
munities involved. However, it seems that with police 
services, the coordination presently necessary already 
exists; and with public works services, problems relating 
to operational procedures and equipment used might be too 
complicated and costly to overcome. Such a formal 
centralized superstructure would also add personnel and 
facilities whose cost probably could not be recouped 
through economics of scale. 
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The towns studied here are already cooperating with 
one another in the delivery of services because it allows 
them to deliver services more efficiently and effectively. 
Even though cooperation is primarily informal (verbal 
agreements between administrators of departments of each 
community), it is working. To suggest that informal agree-
ments should be replaced with formal ones simply because 
they, theoretically, are more dependable (because they have 
some legal standing to fall back on) is questionable in 
this situation and as a general practice. Certainly there 
is more security in formal agreements than in informal 
ones, even if it is primarily psychological; but, making 
informal agreements is easier and less time consuming. 
The informal cooperative efforts which these communities 
have undertaken are more appropriate than formal ones 
given the administrative and organizational constraints 
present. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
If communities prefer different governmental organi-
zations and procedures to make policy and deliver services, 
then why should they change to facilitate the use of formal 
systems to cooperate with each other. This is what would 
be required for some formal mechanisms, such as special 
districts. Other formal mechanisms, such as councils of 
governments, are hampered by these differences. Even 
though they provide a forum for initiating agreements and 
structure for formulating and carrying them out, they do 
so at a cost. The primary cost is time, delays caused by 
superficial discussions and "red :tape". 
When communities informally cooperate in the delivery 
of services they seem to avoid these problems. Yet, the 
Adivsory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has 
stated that informal cooperation is unsuccessful at meeting 
nine objectives which they regard as desirable in areawide 
. d l" 14 h . d f . 1. service e ivery. It says: t at it oes not aci itate 
an adequate geographic area of jurisdiction; that spillover 
costs and benefits cannot be contained within the area of 
jurisdiction responsible for providing service; that it 
does not facilitate an adequate geographic area of juris-
diction; that spillover costs and benefits cannot be 
contained within the area of jurisdiction responsible 
for providing service; that it does not allow for the 
resolution of conflicts and the balancing of needs and 
resources; and, that it does not facilitate other objec-
tives desirable of a cooperative system (see Table 7). 
The Commission compares informal cooperation with other 
mechanisms and summarizes their conclusions in a chart. 
The chart is a continuum showing the effectiveness of 
areawide service delivery approaches versus their feasi-
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bility or political acceptibility (see Figure 10). It says 
that informal cooperation is the most politically feasible 
of thirteen alternatives; but at the same time, it is the 
least effective. 15 
It is true that informal cooperation does not respect 
the criteria of an areawide service delivery system, 
criteria which communities should try to meet when setting 
up a system. However, the nature of informal cooperation is 
different from other, more formal, cooperative systems. 
Formal systems are comprehensive approaches to meeting 
service needs. They are a mechanism prepared for most of 
the possible areawide problems (or needs) a system might be 
confronted with in its future. Informal cooperation is an 
incremental approach to meeting service needs. It allows 
communities to face problems (or needs) as they arise. It 
allows communities to more efficiently and effectively use 
their present service systems, to compensate for their 
inadequacies. 
TABLE 7 
AREAWIDE SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES AND OBJECTIVES 
Type of areawide 
approach 
Adequate 
geographic 
area of 
jurisdiction 
Informal 
Cooperation 
Service contract/ 
joint services 
agreement 0 
Regional council 
of local elected 
officials + 
Federally encouraged 
substate district + 
State planning and 
development 
district + 
Local special 
district + 
Transfer of 
functions 0 
Annexation + 
~reawide special 
district/ 
public authority + 
"Unbrella" regional 
council + 
Urban county 0 
City-county 
consolidation 0 
Federated area-
wide government + 
KEY + = successful 
Legal and 
administrative 
ability to 
perform assigned 
services and 
implement plans 
+ 
-
-
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Contain spill-
over costs and 
benefits within 
jurisdiction 
responsible for 
providing service 
0 
-
-
-
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
Permit 
realization 
of economies 
of scale: 
Staff/Line 
+ + 
+ -
· 0 -
0 -
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
0 = occasionally successful = unsuccessful 
SOURCE: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts. 
Table I-2, page 12. 
Multifunctional; 
governing 
processes involve 
resolution 
of conflicting 
interests and 
balancing of needs 
and resources 
+ 
-
+ 
-
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Increase Ensure 
coordination of equitable 
local projects distribution 
with areawide of 
functional public goods 
and comprehen- and services 
sive development 
plans 
0 
-
+ 
-+ 
-
+ 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
-
a 
+ -
0 + 
0 + 
+ + 
Maximize 
citizen 
participation 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Performance 
of functions 
remains 
controllable 
by and 
jurisdiction 
is accountable 
directly to residents 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
U1 
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This is a viable approach to interlocal cooperation 
in the delivery of services. Assuming that communities 
are the basic building blocks for solving areawide problems, 
any form of cooperation must respect them as individual 
entities. Certainly, they are not isolated from one 
another; there are issues dealing with the delivery of 
services which do not respect local boundaries. These 
issues must be dealt with, and informal cooperation is a 
method of doing so while at the same time respecting the 
autonomy of communities. 
Home rule is a critical issue when considering inter-
local cooperation. Equally important, however, are issues 
dealing with economics, administration and citizen access 
and control. Formal systems are necessary in some situa-
tions, especially when comprehensiveness in meeting the 
Advisory Commission's nine objectives. But in other 
situations, formal systems are either not necessary or 
require extensive reorganization of local governments in 
order to be facilitated. Therefore, it is the conclusion 
of this analysis that informal cooperation has its place, 
and that communities should cooperate with one another in 
the delivery of services in whatever formal or informal 
manner their organizational and administrative situations 
necessitate. 
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